When I met her she was lowkey now she wanna OD
Usually I stay clear of connotation-rich German words that have no real equivalent in other languages. Their purpose is to obfuscate. But there is one that describes the eurozone’s crisis management rather well. It is überfordert. The nearest English translation is “overwhelmed”, or “not on top of something”, but those are not quite the same. You can be overwhelmed one day, and on top the next. Überfordert is as hopeless as Dante’s hell. It has an intellectual and an emotional component. If you are it today, you are it tomorrow.
I am not saying that every policymaker in the eurozone is hopeless. There are a few exceptions. My point is that the system is überfordert, unable to cope. This inability has several dimensions. I have identified six.
The first, and most important, is a tendency to repeat the same mistakes. The biggest of these is the repeated attempt to address solvency problems through liquidity policies. (…)The second is a lack of political co-ordination. All the decisions taken have one thing in common: no one takes political ownership of the whole system. Everybody inside the system is optimising their corner. International investors, by contrast, are looking at the system as a whole and cannot make sense of the cacophony. (…)
The third is a breakdown of communication. The EU has a tendency to hype whatever it agrees. The markets first react with euphoria to the announcement, then with disappointment once they have read the small print. When Germany raised the issue of a permanent anti-crisis mechanism, it gave few details. The markets were spooked. When news came out that Germany had climbed down over the question of automatic bondholder haircuts, the markets were euphoric. Details that have come out since are again more alarming. The way the ESM is constructed will make a debt default in the eurozone dramatically more probable. There is a good case to be made for limiting taxpayers’ liability. But the scope and the details must be conveyed much more clearly.
A fourth aspect is a tendency by governments to blame investors when something goes wrong, rather than solve the problem. (…)
Fifth is the tendency to blame each other. (…)
Finally, a sixth aspect is the tendency to appeal to a deus ex machina when all else fails. That would be the European Central Bank.
I do not want to play down the ECB’s role. Its liquidity policies prevented a calamity in August 2007, and later in the autumn of 2008. But it also delayed a resolution to the political crisis. Europe’s bank resolution policy is the ECB, and only the ECB. That is why this crisis is lasting so long.
The euro is currently on an unsustainable trajectory. The political choice is either to retreat into a corner, and hope for some miracle, or to agree a big political gesture, such as a common European bond. What I hear is that such a gesture will not happen, for a very large number of very small reasons. The system is genuinely überfordert.